TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=91TT1977> <link 91TT1960> <title> Sep. 09, 1991: What About the Nukes? </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1991 Sep. 09, 1991 Power Vacuum </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> WORLD, Page 45 SOVIET UNION What About the Nukes? </hdr><body> In the postcoup U.S.S.R., someone still has to control the 27,000 warheads dispersed through several republics By Michael D. Lemonick--Reported by Bruce van Voorst/Washington and Yuri Zarakhovich/Moscow The hard-liners' coup is history, but one ominous fact remains: the Soviet nuclear arsenal contains some 27,000 warheads scattered through several republics. Who will now control them? During the three days of Gorbachev's confinement, his so-called football--the satchel containing launch-authorization codes--was in the hands of the junta, raising concerns that its leaders might, in desperation, do something rash. And now, with at least the partial breakup of the U.S.S.R. a certainty, fears are growing that some of the seceding republics may insist that the weapons remain on their soil, in effect creating a new nuclear power with every declaration of independence. Wondered French government spokesman Jack Lang last week: "Will every republic have at its disposal a little atomic bomb, some of them equivalent to one or two Hiroshimas?" Most experts, though, believe the threat of atomic war was minimal during the coup and will probably remain so even if the Union dissolves. One reason is that virtually all the U.S.S.R.'s strategic nuclear arms--the missile- and bomber-borne kinds that threaten other nations--are in just four republics: Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan. Of the four, Russia holds 80% or more of the strategic nukes. So far, the actions of Russian President Boris Yeltsin concerning the weapons have been reassuring. He insisted late last week that "any division of strategic weapons among the republics is unequivocally ruled out." Yeltsin also said he and Gorbachev will convene a meeting of national security officials, including those from the republics, to discuss control of Soviet nuclear weapons. Yeltsin favors sharing control between the central government and the republics--a policy that would make the chances of an ill- advised nuclear attack even less likely than they were before the coup. Two other republics with strategic nukes have gone still further toward yielding control. Both Ukraine and Belorussia have proclaimed themselves nuclear-free zones, and Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev decreed the closing of the underground nuclear testing center at Semipalatinsk, though he has not yet agreed to give up the weapons. Perhaps the most important reason for Western confidence, though, is that the Soviet Union's system of nuclear command and control has at least as many checks and balances as the U.S.'s, and perhaps more. Says Michael Dewar, deputy director of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies: "There are several stages, an intricate system of codes and identifications, before nuclear weapons can be fired from the ground, from airplanes or from submarines." The system provides for two "footballs," while the U.S. has but one. To ready nuclear warheads for a launch, the codes from both footballs--one in the hands of the head of state and the other from the Minister of Defense--must be mated in the headquarters of the general staff. The combined codes would then be sent as an encrypted message down the chain of command to the operating forces. The final step in launching a missile is the turning of two separate keys simultaneously; again in common with U.S. procedures, the Soviet crewmen are separated by about 10 ft., so it is impossible for one person to launch a missile singlehandedly. The system for submarines is somewhat different, but again there are strict safeguards. These safeguards were not the only reason Washington felt the chances of a nuclear accident were minimal during the coup: there was no logical reason why the plotters might launch nuclear weapons at the U.S. "After all," observes John Steinbruner, director of foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, "the same deterrence structure that kept them from doing it during the cold war remained in place." Moreover, the U.S. and NATO went out of their way during the crisis to avoid sending any signals of tension. And finally, notes Rand Corp. Soviet expert Edward Warner, the plotters' problem "was getting the KGB Alpha group to storm parliament. Nuclear release was the furthest thing in their minds." That opinion was confirmed by U.S. and British intelligence, which detected no activity suggesting a potential strike. In fact, Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces commander General Yuriy Maksimov withdrew SS-25 mobile missiles into their garrisons at the height of the tension, thereby tightening security and reducing the chances of a rogue launch. Says Brookings analyst Bruce Blair: "General Maksimov's action sent the strongest possible signal to the U.S. that nothing was up." The situation is somewhat different for tactical warheads--smaller nukes meant for battlefield use. These are more widely distributed through the republics. But many have been pulled out of the most unstable republics, including the Baltics and Azerbaijan. And in most cases, tactical nukes are stored separately from their launch systems, in fortified bunkers guarded by Ministry of Defense soldiers. Still, Soviet and U.S. experts agree there are no grounds for complacency; the republics' apparent willingness to share nuclear authority with the central government could change, and existing safeguards could be weakened. With difficult independence negotiations ahead, some republics may yet decide to use nukes as bargaining chips. Comments Vikenty Matveyev, a respected political columnist for Izvestia: "No matter what authoritative military spokesmen say, the key problem of nuclear weapons in this country is the fact that they exist in great numbers and are dispersed throughout vast territories." Matveyev's suggestion: quickly cut the Soviet nuclear arsenals down and leave only the bare minimum of warheads. With the increasing irrelevance of mutual nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., that is probably the safest course of all. </body></article> </text>